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Archive for February, 2009

Bernanke Resigns!…?

Yesterday morning, after not getting enough sleep, I sat down to listen to Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, testify before one of those ubiquitous congressional committees. Although I worried that this show might put me to sleep, I wanted to listen to what the nation’s money manager would say. The testimony began, and I heard this:

“Gentlemen, I have come before you today to resign my position as the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System. Before I describe how and when my resignation will take effect I want to explain why I made the decision to take this action.

“Several months ago a member of my staff came to me and ask the question, ‘What if everything we do here does more damage than it does good?’ I decided to pursue the question and asked the staff member to head a study of the question. I have included the details of our study in a paper that I will provide to this committee. I will simply summarize our findings.

“The artificial expansion of the money supply that occurs in the reserve banking system does nothing but harm to the national economy. This monetary expansion acts as a form of taxation for anyone who has any portion of their saving in cash or a cash equivalent. As a result we harm the very people we have claimed to help. In addition, continual monetary expansion sends false messages about capital formation throughout the system. People, believing available credit signals capital formation, make investment they should not make and borrow money that they should not borrow. In short, monetary expansion causes people to make all the mistakes that have lead to this and earlier economic down turns. You will understand this process better after you have read our report.

“In addition to discovering the generalized damage that monetary expansion causes, we came to realize that the two primary objectives of the Federal Reserve — stable prices and full employment — rest on flawed theory.

“First, contrary to what we have advocated for years, markets should not have stable prices. The movement of prices, up and down, provide the signals to the market as to where it should allocate capital. By attempting to stabilize prices we distort those signals thereby causing misallocation of capital resources.

“Second, attempting to stimulate full employment through monetary policy has the same effect I referred to earlier, but it focuses those detrimental effects on the labor market. Briefly, monetary expansion causes employment to increase in segments of the market based on unsustainable demand. We indirectly encourage the creation of dead-end jobs. The market will do much better at allocating jobs.

“I now return to the when and how of my resignation.

“In our research we discovered a little known regulation that allows the governors of the Federal Reserve to liquidate the Federal Reserve Banks. We have already set that process in motion, and my resignation will become effective as soon as the last Federal Reserve Bank has closed its doors. But, I caution the members of Congress that these actions will not by themselves solve the problems of artificial monetary expansion.

“Congress must take action to eliminate the fractional reserve banking system that exists in this country. This country will continue have these severe economic fluctuations until the government removes the legal support of fractional reserve banking.”

With a start, I suddenly awoke from the sleep into which I had slipped. I looked at the television to discover that what I had just heard did not match what Chairman Bernanke had actually said.

Well, I have the right to dream. Don’t I?

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Economic Multipliers

I have heard a lot of chatter in the uninformed media about “economic multipliers.” I saw one particular commentator rant on for several minutes about how people who oppose the economic stimulus package don’t understand the impact of spending multipliers. The justification for government fiscal “stimulus” rests, to a large degree, on the theory of economic multipliers.

A brief explanation might help those who have started scratching their heads, asking, “Multiplier? What?”

A multiplier effect occurs in an economic system when new resources (usually in the form of money) enter the system from an external (exogenous, for systems freaks) source. This means that, if someone gives you $1,000 from outside your economy, you will spend most of it. The stores at which you spend this new found money will pay employees, suppliers, and maybe shareholders. Those people will, in turn, spend the money they receive at other stores. Those other stores will spend the money they receive in much the same fashion. When you sum the prices of all those transactions they will equal something more than the $1,000 that you originally received.

Now, some economist claim they can actually calculate multipliers based on who gets the money originally. If you got that money in the form of food stamps, some calculated that the economy would benefit by total spending of $1,670 (if my memory serves me.)

Sounds like a pretty good deal. Maybe we should keep stimulus going all the time. (Oh, sorry. I guess we do. We call it government spending.)

Whether you accept the multipliers calculated by economists, the whole theory suffers from one serious flaw: The government has no exogenous (external) sources for its money.

The government took the $1,000 that it gave to you from someone else in your economic system. This means that someone will not spend $1,000. The stores at which they do not spend the confiscated money will not pay employees, not pay suppliers, and not pay shareholders. Those people will, in turn, not spend the money they do not receive at other stores. Those other stores will not spend the money they do not receive in much the same fashion.

By taking money from the same economy they claim to stimulate legislators rob the economy of some unseen and unrealized benefit. (I have thought of referring to this as an “economic divider.”)

Politicians will probably argue that they can allocate resources more efficiently than that guy from whom they took the $1,000. Of course, they do not have to defend that statement. The losers cannot calculate the amount of their losses.

When I look at the track record of government spending, I continue to trust that unnamed guy who had his money stolen.

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Nationalization

Does the recent talk about nationalizing the banking industry surprise me?

No. The fact that people have not talked about it for years surprises me.

Remember, we live in the country that regularly confiscates peoples property through the tax system. We have seen the expansion of the “right of eminent domain.” And, with five minutes of research, I could come up with probably fifty examples of federal regulations that restrict your use of your own property. Also, legislators talk about “paying for” tax cuts as if your income already belongs to them.

So, one could argue that nationalization already runs rampant in this country, in fact if not in name. But, I find it particularly surprising the people express alarm at the idea of nationalizing the banking system. We have had a nationalized banking system for a long time.

First, where do you think the money that flows through the banking system comes from? The federal government has given monopoly power to the Federal Reserve and member banks to create money. You pick the time when you think private money ended: when Nixon severed the connection of dollars to gold for international transactions; when FDR confiscated all privately owned gold and fixed gold’s dollar value; when congress passed the Federal Reserve Act. The term “fiat money” means nationalized money.

Second, the government guarantees most bank deposits through the FDIC. So the deposit contract does not include only the depositor and the bank as it should. Making the government a party to that contract makes it a nationalized contract.

Third, all banks operate under monopoly charters from government — either federal or state. Bank owners run their banks at the behest of some government.

Fourth, banks must adhere to a laundry list of federal regulations (so what else is new) far more onerous than other businesses.

Finally (for now), because of the points listed above banks get inspected by various government organizations on a regular schedule. And these inspectors have the power to dictate which loans banks must classify as good, bad, or write-off.

So, what will nationalization, as now discussed, really do? I will simply pull back the thin veil of private equity ownership to expose the already nationalized banking system.

(By the way have you ever heard of names like The First National Bank, National Bank of Arizona, Montgomery County National Bank?)

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W. Edwards Deming, the great statistician and management wizard, identified two mistakes that managers commonly make when attempting to fix unwanted variations in systems.

  1. Ascribe a variation or mistake to a special cause when in fact the cause belongs to the system (common causes.)
  2. Ascribe a variation or mistake to the system (common causes) when in fact the cause was special.*

In his book Out of the Crisis Deming describes in detail the differences between variance occurring because of common or special causes. To get a full understanding of systemic variance, I suggest you read the book, but let me try to summarize the differences between common or special causes of variance.

First, you must understand that the behavior of all systems varies over time. Every item off a factory line differs to some degree from every other item; every rotation of the earth differs slightly from the last; and every tree in a forest differs from the next. But most of those variances result from the structure of the system — what Deming calls a common cause. In a stable system those variances will stay within a predictable range.

Second, occasionally the system will behave outside the normal range of variance. A machine might break, causing a particular difference in the factory’s products. An earthquake might cause the earth to wobble slightly more than usual. An infection might stunt the growth of a few trees in a forest.

When managers make the first mistake they act to change a particular event when, in reality, they need to change the structure of the entire system. Frequently managers ignore problems caused by a change in the system when they think a particular outcome amounts to anomalous behavior. Failure to act may lead to a complete breakdown in the entire system.

When managers make the second mistake they tend to make system wide changes, when a small local change might solve the problem. That system wide change might cause the system to spin out of control. For example, because of wear, one machine in a factory needs adjusting 5 degrees to the left. The foreman, assuming all the machines have worn the same, adjusts all the other machines 5 degrees to the left. The next day he finds that one machine produces items according to specification and all the other machines do not.

Deming’s lessons about these two mistakes apply in all systems. The more managers avoid these mistakes the better their performance and the more profit they produce. But, the lessons also apply in government.

Governments perpetually make mistake number 2. They see one case of fraud and they make laws treating everyone like a fraud. They have one hijacking and they treat everyone like a hijacker. A few kids in school fail and they create systems that treat all kids the same.

When a business makes mistake number 2, the business may fail. When the government makes mistake number 2, we all suffer.

—————

* from Out of the Crisis page 318.

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“If we don’t do something, the markets will crash.”

“To not act would be irresponsible.”

“There comes a time when the government must act.”

Turn on any channel, or read any blog, that deals with economic news and you will hear phrases like these. Business people seem to agree. Television commentators seem to agree. Politicians seem to agree. And, of course, economists seem to agree. Especially the president agrees that, if the government doesn’t act, something so unspeakable, so horrible, so terrifying, will happen in the economy that none of these people will describe it.

They don’t say, because they don’t know. They have not a clue what would happen to the economy if the government simply did nothing.

I certainly cannot predict exactly what would happen, if the government did nothing. But I do know two things for certain:

First, I know that artificial money expansion, government redistribution (taxing and spending), and government regulation together have caused this problem. More of the same, therefore, will not solve the problem. You don’t increase heroin intake to cure a heroin addiction.

Second, markets do work. The current crisis does not prove that markets fail. On the contrary, this crisis proves that you cannot fool the market in the long run. The market figured out that people had made malinvestments in real estate and the instruments that finance real estate. The market took steps to liquidate those malinvestments, which it must to get healthy again.

Likewise, when market prices realign with values based on the other resources in the economy, they will stop sliding and the economy will heal. Markets do not commit economic suicide. They adjust and move on.

Government intervention, on the other hand, will do one of two things: 1) the economy will “turn around” and we will see a bigger crash in the future; 2) the intervention will exacerbate the problems, which will lead to more intervention and more problems (ever hear of the Great Depression.)

Those who advocate the “we must do something, or else…” graduated from the Jim Jones school of economics. They want you to drink the Koolaid laced with money expansion, government transfers, and regulation.

Drink at your own risk.

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I must admit that, as a native of Denver, Colorado, I suffer a bit of embarrassment for our city hosting the Economic Stimulus Circus. President Barrack Obama, and his groupies, will arrive in a couple of hours. In a carnival display, that typifies of his young administration, he will waste an incredible amount of taxpayer money. He will cut into the productivity of our town by having streets closed. He will do all this so he can grandstand the signing of what people in government and the media call the economic stimulus package.

This nearly $800 Billion redistribution of wealth will not stimulate the national economy any more than the circus accompanying its signing will stimulate the economy of Colorado. The circus will cost the taxpayers of Colorado and the stimulus package will cost the taxpayers of the nation.

How do I know this? Have I, unlike the legislators who voted on this bill and the president who will sign it, actually read the bill?

No, I have not read this bill, and I do not need to read it to understand that it cannot work. That’s right: cannot work.

This stimulus cannot work for the simple reason that it will take resources from more productive people and organizations and give those resources to less productive people and organizations. We have this economic problem, in part, because we have made these redistributions in the past — it’s what government does. Doing more of the same will not get us different results. As a matter of fact, doing this in the middle of a recession will only aggravate the problems.

Do we need to get consumers spending more in order to get the economy going?

Consider this, then answer the question yourself:

Have you ever consumed something that you, or someone else, had not first produced?

Increased consumption in the face of declining production amounts to an economic dead end. Purchases of consumer goods might increase until inventories get worked down. Production will not then increase because productive businesses will no longer have the capital that government so generously took to give to consumers.

Think about it.

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Last night I watched the CNBC documentary, House of Cards, presented by David Faber. I wanted to see if, after extensive research, Faber would identify the real source of the building material for the financial “House of Cards.” What I saw did not surprise me.

I think that Faber did a good job of portraying many of the activities involved in the crash of the real estate mortgage market. He also followed the trail from the mortgage origination to their bundling in mortgage back securities.

Viewers of this show might leave with a better understanding of the mechanics of this market. But, would they really have a better understanding of the root cause of this crisis?

The metaphor of the house of cards fits the situation quite nicely because the structure of this market did not have the strength to maintain the staggering growth rate. But, even when building a house of cards the builders must have a supply of the building material. If this building had run out of building material, the builders would not have completed the unsound structure.

So, if not cards (of course), what material did these builders use to construct this doomed structure?

Money. Without the continual artificial expansion of the supply of money the mess would have never occurred. Lenders would have had a stricter limit on the amount of loans they could make. Buyers, conversely, would have had few opportunities to borrow money they could not repay. With less money available buyers would not have bid house prices to ridiculous levels. And without this artificially stimulated volume of mortgage money securities backed by mortgages would have had a much smaller market.

Does that mean we should all point our fingers at Ben Bernanke or Alan Greenspan? Or should we pick on the bankers who made these loans?

No. To continue the building material metaphor, the problem rests with the factory that manufactures the building materials, not the various managers. The factory consists of the reserve banking system. As long as someone has the capacity to manufacture money the economy will continue to suffer these ups and downs.

Quit trying to find someone to blame. Shut down the “card factory.” Terminate the reserve banking system.

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Changing organizational performance may seem simple and easy. Examining assumptions engenders double-loop learning and a deeper understanding of the influences on behavior. Conversation and action changes the structure of assumptions and then behavior and performance. People could accurately describe these processes as simple, but they should not consider them as easy.

Chris Argyris has researched the subject of organizational learning for decades. He has pointed out in many books and articles that the reasoning processes of people in organizations create the primary obstacle to organizational learning. That reasoning process generates organizational defensive routines that inhibit learning, and without real learning, organizations cannot achieve meaningful change.

See The ConnectionsBecause of the lack of organizational learning rational people frequently take action that impedes the achievement of their own objectives. As perverse as this may seem, Argyris’ research seems to confirm this contention. People in organizations constantly espouse theories that contradict the theories revealed by their actions—he contends that people’s actions reflect their true beliefs. Although such behavior seems paradoxical, one can consider it logically consistent when one knows all the thinking involved.

To better understand the reasoning process, let’s first consider one manifestation of organizational defensive routines—mixed messages. Argyris has constructed four rules for designing and implementing mixed messages:

  1. Design a message that is inconsistent.
  2. Act as if the message is not inconsistent.
  3. Make the inconsistency in the message, and the act that there is no inconsistency, undiscussable.
  4. Make the undiscussability of the undiscussable also undiscussable. [1]  

These rules may seem ridiculous to you, or they may give you an uncomfortable feeling of truth, but consider the following example:

Imagine that your company has implemented a policy of open communication. You attend a meeting in which a supervisor tells an employee that his sales presentation lacked the polish needed to make it effective. After the meeting, a fellow employee, who strongly supports the open communication policy, says that the supervisor should not have been so blunt and insensitive. To you it seems inconsistent that, in the interest of open communication, this employee did not speak up in the meeting.

You do not know, however, that this employee believes that to have spoken up in the meeting would have been too blunt and insensitive. By not acting blunt and insensitive, he has behaved in a logically consistent manner, yet he has employed a theory-in-practice that conflicts with his espoused theory of open communication.

In this example, the actor has delivered a message that is inconsistent with his actions. Yet, he acts as if no inconsistency exists. This behavior becomes particularly troublesome when one discovers that he does not see the inconsistency in his behavior. To him it seems perfectly logical.

Argyris points out that this pattern of conflicting behavior emerges from higher order abstract thinking. The actors build a set of beliefs based on previous experience, which remains largely untested. As Rick Ross states in The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook, “Our ability to achieve the results we truly desire is eroded by our feelings that:

  • Our beliefs are the truth.
  • The truth is obvious.
  • Our beliefs are based on real data.
  • The data we select are the real data.”[2]  

This pattern of reasoning creates what Argyris describes as invalid knowledge. He argues that organizations cannot learn effectively when they operate based on invalid knowledge. Management has a basic responsibility to develop valid knowledge in an organization in order that it may perform effectively, learn and maintain its competitive position.

Argyris offers a much more extensive and well-documented argument than I have presented here. To fully understand his argument requires a little concentration and persistence, for the argument runs counter to what we tend to consider rational behavior. He makes, however, a sufficiently compelling case that you will soon see how organizations create some of their own biggest obstacles to learning and progress through their own reasoning processes.


Notes:
[1]Argyris, Chris. On Organizational Learning. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1992, 1994. Page 42.

 [2]Senge, Peter M., et. al. The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook. New York: Doubleday, 1994. “The Ladder of Inference” by Rick Ross. Page 242.

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The two big wigs in the financial community testify before congress on the same day and the market drops nearly 5%. What does that tell us?

If you listen to the commentators, you might think the market did not like precisely what those specific individuals said. On that basis Tim Geithner got the most criticism because he did not say exactly what the Treasury Department will do next. Markets definitely do not like uncertainty. But, markets also have more intelligence than most people realize. (See the Wisdom of Crowds.)

I think the market saw the symbolism represented by the testimony of the heads of these two government agencies. (Oh, don’t argue with me about the private ownership of the Fed. What private company has the CEO appointed by the President of the United States and gives its profits to the U. S. Treasury?) These two men symbolize the system that created this problem in the first place. Their appearance before congress reinforces the mistaken believe that the source of the problems can also provide the cure.

Ben Bernanke. The man and his beliefs symbolize faith in the reserve banking system, in which banks create money virtually at will. This system destroys the wealth of millions of U. S. citizens, distorts the pricing mechanism, and causes the booms and busts that rock the economy with too much regularity. The money supply has grown steadily through the tenures of all these Fed Chairmen:

William McChesney Martin, Jr.

April 2, 1951 – February 1, 1970

Arthur F. Burns

February 1, 1970 – January 31, 1978

G. William Miller

March 8, 1978 – August 6, 1979

Paul A. Volcker

August 6, 1979 – August 11, 1987

Alan Greenspan

August 11, 1987 – January 31, 2006

Ben Bernanke

February 1, 2006 –

As well as those who preceded them.

So don’t blame these men. The problem lies with the system in which they operate.

Tim Geithner. Most people, most of the time, don’t know who holds the position of the Secretary of the Treasury. The relative importance of these men depend a lot on the responsibilities given them by the President in office at the time. This guy and his predecessor, Henry Paulson, have the distinction of holding the position at a time in which it seems important. The position, however, has more significance than the man holding the position.

The Treasury Secretary symbolizes the foolish idea that government spending plays a positive role in the health of the American Economy. Government only redistributes economic resources to less than optimum utilization. Having the Treasury Secretary testify only verifies the fact that legislators have not given up the foolish idea of redistribute.

If Roadrunner and Wiley Coyote held the titles of Fed Chairmen and Treasury Secretary, the market would have reacted the same. Deep down the market understands that only the system matters; the men do not.

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Value: What’s It Worth?

What value do houses have? What value do mortgages have? What value does gasoline have? Or, what value does labor have?

Questions like these seem to have legislators, regulators, economists and commentators tied in knots. In order to get the toxic assets off the bank balance sheets they must know how to establish the value of those assets. In order for lenders to make mortgage loans they want to know the value of the houses taken as security. The question of value comes up over and over.

So, what’s it worth?

The people asking these questions about value seemed to have missed a key factor in sound economic theory. That key factor consists of the subjective nature of value. Only an individual consumer can determine the value of anything on the market. And that consumer can only express value in terms of his personal preferences for the item in question relative to other economic goods.

He might value apples more than oranges, or a house more than a tractor; or a computer more than a case of paper, or a motorcycle more than a donkey. But none of these items have an intrinsic or fundamental value. Value has no unit that the consumer can apply to all goods nor that he can add up to determine his total wealth.

Doesn’t money give us a measure of value?

No. Money consists of another economic good for which consumers have a preference to hold relative to other economic goods. The value of money goes up and down in the ordinal scale of each consumer’s preferences just like all other economic goods. When the consumer pays $15 for a beer at the Super Bowl, that does not mean that beer has a value of $15. It means that the consumer, at that place and time, preferred having the beer more than having the $15 he paid for the beer.

Doesn’t cost determine value?

Again, no. Cost simply reflects what a supplier gave up to acquire the economic good based on his preference. If our beer salesman paid $100 for the beer referred to above (based on his expectation of captive sales), that does not make it worth $100. If no one in the audience values the beers he bought more than $100, he will have to sell them for $15 or whatever he can get (or take them home for his own party.)

So, back to the substance of the question. How can our friendly regulators value assets owned by the banks they want to bail out? In two words, they cannot. Only individual buyers determine value. And only actors in a free market can determine price, based on their values.

So, what do they do?

Let the market decide.

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